Good book
Inside the anger that gave us Trump — and that will long outlast him
"Age of Anger: A History of the Present"
With President Trump in office, Timothy Snyder writes, “The minor choices we make are themselves a kind of vote.” (Photo by Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post)
AGE OF ANGER: A History of the Present
However long the Donald Trump presidency is with us — eight years, four years or less — the forces that propelled him to power will not dissipate with his departure. If anything, without Trump as a focal point galvanizing supporters and opponents, those forces may become harder to control, channel or even understand.
Economic grievances and racial animus compete as the two shorthand explanations for Trump’s rise, and among the president’s liberal critics, it is a near article of faith that the former rationale is overly generous, while the latter is more accurate and (bonus!) more damning. After all, it is simpler and more righteous to call out the horrifying rhetoric of pro-Trump white nationalists than to Piketty your way through diagnoses and remedies for economic inequality.
Pankaj Mishra’s “Age of Anger” is a book about many things, a sort of intellectual history of history itself. But if there is one convincing conclusion that emanates from these pages, it is that these alternative explanations are not competing; in fact, they are barely alternatives. The two are bound together, reinforcing each other in cycles that long pre-date the Trump phenomenon.
(Farrar, Straus and Giroux)
What the world has endured in the quarter-century since the end of the Cold War — the triumph of political liberty and economic globalization, only to be followed by financial crises, populist movements and transnational terrorism — is but the latest iteration, on a wider scale, of what has happened for centuries. “The unprecedented political, economic and social disorder that accompanied the rise of the industrial capitalist economy in nineteenth century Europe, and led to world wars, totalitarian regimes and genocide in the first half of the twentieth century, is now infecting much vaster regions and bigger populations,” Mishra writes. “Societies organized for the interplay of individual self-interest can collapse into manic tribalism, if not nihilistic violence.”
Those impulses can take the form of 18th-century revolutions, 19th-century anarchist movements, 20th-century ethnic cleansing, and 21st-century terrorism and nationalism. Viciousness and prejudice flow from economic dislocation, and in turn feed it. History privileges no right side, and its arc can bend so far that it loops back upon us.
“Now with the victory of Donald Trump,” Mishra writes, “it has become impossible to deny or obscure the great chasm . . . between an elite that seizes modernity’s choicest fruits while disdaining older truths and uprooted masses, who, on finding themselves cheated of the same fruits, recoil into cultural supremacism, populism and rancorous brutality.”
There is nothing worse than partial modernity. And all modernity, it turns out, is partial.
***
Mishra is a fellow of the Royal Society of Literature, and he writes like he’s trying to remind you of that. Every novel or manifesto by some 19th-century Russian philosopher, post-Enlightenment Italian literati wannabe or Hindu nationalist ideologue merits a few pages or at least a few sentences. Straddling the line between erudition and showing off, this book makes you feel smarter for having read it, even if you feel a little stupid first.
Mishra paints in thick, furious strokes, then lingers on minute details. Together, the French and Industrial revolutions conspired to produce capitalist modernization, “the universalist creed that glorified the autonomous rights-bearing individual and hailed his rational choice-making capacity as freedom,” Mishra writes. Faith in science, economics and rationality began to overpower faith in, well, faith, as Enlightenment thinkers “hoped to apply the scientific method discovered in the previous century to phenomena beyond the natural world, to government, economics, ethics, law, society.” This new faith would also yield the cult of “development” — equating progress with the inexorable advance of science and industry, and the requisite downgrading of tradition and religion.
If that had worked, this book would not exist. However, “instead of harmonizing socially mediated interests,” Mishra writes, “an increasingly industrialized economy created class antagonisms and gross inequalities.” Fyodor Dostoyevsky grasped the conflict; Mishra recalls how, during a visit to Paris, the Russian writer caustically concluded that “liberté” was just for millionaires, “égalité” did no